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short, there is no inconsistency in the teaching of the bish < ; on
abortion and their teaching on war. They hold, as the Chu r
has
always held and as the Church will continue to hold until the
d of
time, that there are universally binding principles of the natur and
evangelical law, and that these principles absolutely proscri
the
choice to kill innocent human persons. 16
Catholic teaching on the question of abortion - and on th l UeS·
tion of killing innocent people in war - is unmistakably clea This
teaching is presented to the faithful as certain and true, and t h aithful have an obligation in conscience to give internal religious as nt to
this teaching. 17 The effort to set it aside and to claim that teac ngin
contradiction to it can be legitimately entertained by Cath ics is
spurious and deceitful. The dec~itfulness of this attempt, I be ve, is
manifested by Maguire's choice, knowingly made, to conceal f"
his
readers significant passages from the pastoral on war and pea' , passages which he knew could not support and indeed were intri ically
destructive of the thesis that he sought to establish in his article
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Do children born with severe handicaps have a right to live, to
receive the food and medical treatment necessary for them to live, as
Would a child born without handicaps? Or should the parents of such
children be given the private decision to choose whether the child
should live or die, on the basis of their judgment of the quality of the
child's life and of the degree of burden he or she will pose for their
family or society?
.
.
That is the issue at the heart of the great national debate now
raging over the fate of handicapped children and over what role, if
any, government and the law should have in protecting their lives. At
stake in that debate is the continued viability of one of the most
cherished principles in American jurisprudence: the equality of all
persons before the law. Are persons with disabilities to be treated as
· equal befort-! the law?
This is not really a debate over the respective roles of the state and
l>arents in making decisions about and for their children . That issue
has been long settled, as is decidedly shown by the recently publicized
cases involving court-ordered treatment for "normal" children over the
religious objections of their parents.I Parents have traditionally been
accorded great autonomy in making decisions for and about their
off~pring, because it has been presumed that they act for the benefit
of their children. But when that presumption is disproved by their
COnduct - when they engage in child abuse or neglect - the state, in
the_ exercise of its parens patriae power, has always had the authority
to Intervene on behalf of the best interests of the child. Nor, despite
all the rhetoric about "Big Brother" and " Baby Doe Squads," is this
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authority the subject of controversy . It becomes so only w hr
exercised on behalf of a handicapped child. The issue for tl
then, is whet her the child with a disability ought to be treat
same as or differently from the child with no disability wl
parents want to let him die and there is an effort to use the pc
the state to let him live.
This article will review the legal precedents and principles a t
then consider in their light how the courts have dealt w1
Bloomington, Indiana Infant Doe case, the Stony Brook, N e¥.
Baby Jane Doe case, and the litigation surrounding the vario
sions of the federal " Baby Doe " regulation.
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The Legal Precedents and Principles
All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, An ·rican
Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have child abu. ' and
neglect statutes which provide for the protection of .a child wh does
not receive needed medical care.2
A review of cases makes it clear that these statutes are p1 1perly
applied to secure emergency medical treatment and sustenance (food
or water, whether given orally or ·through intravenous or nas t·~as tric
tube) for children when parents, with or without the acquiesc< 1ce of
physicians, refuse to provide it.
In Custody of a Minor (No . 3), 3 the highest court of Massac11usetts
held that parental failure to provide medical care to a chil'l with
leukemia constituted neglect. The court specifically rejected t he con·
tention that parental rights could justify a decision to withh o ld treatment necessary to save the life of the child:
[W] here, as h e re , the child 's ve ry li fe is th reatened by a parental d e cisio n
re garding m edical treatmen t .. . t he safegua r ding of children fro m ~ buse
cl early supersedes pare ntal pre rogatives . 4

The common law right of parents to make decisions abo u t health
care for their children is broad, but it is based on the presumption that
parents will act in the child's best interest. The law's tradition al d eference to parental discretion in selecting health care alterna tives for
children stops if that choice is adverse to the child's interest s, especially the child's interest in continued life even with handicaps. As
long as the parents make an . informed choice from professionallY
accepted medical treatment alternatives, courts will be satisfied that
the parents are acting in the best interests of the child and will not
find parental neglect in such conduct. Just as in the more ty pical and
egregious case of parental abuse or neglect, when a parent 's acts or
omissions endanger the life or threaten severe damage to the healt h of
the child, the court will intervene to protect the child. " T h e parent
... may not depr~ve a child of lifesaving treatment, howe ver wellintentioned. Even when the parents' decision to decline n ecessarY
treatment is based on constitutional grounds, such as religious beliefs,
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it must yield to the State 's interests, as parens patriae, in protecting
the health and welfare of the child. " 5
The case of a child who may bleed to death because of the parents'
refusal to authorize a blood transfusion presents the classic scenario in
which this doctrine is uniformly invoked. 6
. · · In re Cicero 7 is a New York case in which parents refused consent
for lifesaving medical treatment. A baby was born with spina bifida,
and the medical testimony indicated that immediate surgery was necessary to safeguard the child 's life. When the parents refused to consent to the surgery , the chief executive officer of the hospital petitioned to be appointed guardian of the baby girl. He wished to be
appointed for the sole purpose of operating on the baby 's spinal
lesion. The court found that, because of the infant 's physical condition, she was in imminent danger unless the surgery was performed,
and that the child's welfare demanded judicial intervention. The surgery was ordered over the parents' objections.
In an unreported case which is similar to the widely publicized
Bloomington, Indiana "Infant Doe" case, a boy was born in Maine
with gross deformities which encompassed nearly the entire left side
of his body. Brain damage was indicated . He also had a tracheal fistula
and could not be fed by mouth. Surgery to repair the fistula , which
was the only immediate threat to his life, could have been performed,
but the parents refused to consent. Several physicians at the medical
center, including the pediatric surgeon who had been scheduled to
operate, filed a petition alleging neglect . The trial judge granted t he
petition and ordered that the surgery be performed, stating in his
order that at the moment of live birth there exists a human being
entitled to the fullest protection of the law, and that the most basic
right enjoyed by ev~ry human being is the right to life itself. s
In In re Vasko, 9 a New York court upheld the validity of a state
statute which created a children 's court with jurisdiction over neglected children, including in the definition of such children those
Whose parents refused to provide lifesaving medical care . The trial
court had properly exercised its discretion in ordering, despite parent s'
objection, an eye removal operation when the medical diagnosis
showed that the child suffered from glioma, a malignant growth on
the ·eye, which probably would result in death if not corrected .
This sampling of cases provides ample justification for seeking and
&ecuring a court order to mandate lifesaving medical treatmentand
~Ustenance for a handicapped child despit e parent al object ions . There
~ also a strong basis in legal t heory for the conclusion that t hose
lllvolved in the intentional denial of t reatment and sustenance are
su.bject to prosecution for homicide or att empted homicide, as well as
cruninal child neglect.
Courts have uniformly held that a parent has the legal responsibility
of furnishing his dependent child with adequate food and medical
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care. 10 Lafave and Scott state that failure to provide one's ch iJ
necessities of life, assuming that the parent has the ability to r
the care, is criminally culpable conduct:

.vith
vide

Inte ntional death may be effectively brought about by an omission t
ct
... if th e re is a duty to act. A special example is the duty o f a pa re . LO
rescu e his imperiled infant. So a pare nt who fails to call a doctor to a t .1d
his sick child may be guilty of criminal homicide if the child should d 1 o r
want of medical care. 11

Similarly, Wharton, on Criminal Law, notes:
It is said that for a parent having special charge of an infant child
so
culpably neglect it that d eath e nsues is . . . murder if there was an in tl· to
inflict death. To constitute murder there mus t be .. . wilfulness in wi t h ! !ding relief. 12

The courts have consistently applied this standard to insta: ·es in
which parents have failed either to feed or to provide lifesavin ~ aledical care to their children. A Michigan case, People v. Lynch, in lved
a mother's murder conviction for deliberately withholding fo • ·l and
medical treatment from a handicapped infant.13 Altho u1 . the
mother's conviction was reversed on procedural grounds, the Jy nch
court stated unequivocally that if evidence shows that a paren · deliberately withholds care from a child and if this results in th e : hild 's
death, then the "charge would be appropriately classified as murci ·r." 14
Disabled Children Are 'Persons'
Children born with disabilities are "persons" within the prot ection
of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. "Like an y infant,
the deformed child is a person with a right to life -a right th at is the
basis of our social order and legal system,"15 Under the 14th Amendment, "No state shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisd iction
the equal protection of the laws." 16 A state court refusal to en ter an
order mandating lifesaving sustenance or treatment because the child
had a disability would constitute a denial of equal protect io n on
account of disability. If the court would order sustenance and t reatment for a "normal" child, but allow it to be withheld fro m a child
with a handicap, then this would constitute invidious discri mination
on the basis of disability.
.
Since a good case can be made that the disabled are a "susp~ct
class,"17 state action discriminating against them is subject to " str1ct
scrutiny." 18
Under strict scrutiny, discriminatory state action must be justified
by a "compelling state interest" to be constitutional. Even if the
handicapped are not a suspect class, discrimination agai nst thelll
would still require a legitimate state interest to be constitutional. 19
The elimination of those with a purportedly low "qualit y of life."
can qualify neither as a compelling nor as a legitimate interest in thiS
48
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context. Even if there is a state interest in reducing the incidence of
disabilities because of the possible "burdens" individuals with disabilities impose on family members and society as a whole, it may not
constitutionally be fostered by eliminating the victims of handi_capping conditions. No one would argue that, to advance an interest in
reducing the incidence of sickle-cell anemia, the State might constitutionally execute blacks who suffer from the disease, or that, to
advance an interest in reducing poverty, the State might constitutionally completely withdraw police protection from poor people while
answering all calls for police assistance from those with incomes above
poverty level.
These are arguments on behalf of the constitutional rights of the
child to equal treatment. On the other hand, attorneys for the parents
and doctors are likely to claim that their decision is protected by
constitutional rights of physicians to practice medicine, by parental
Privacy rights, and by the child's right to die. Such claims are
·
unfounded.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that physicians may rely on no
independent constitutional right:
Nothing .. . sugges ts that a docto r's right to adminis t e r medical care h as a ny
greater strength than his patie nt 's righ t t o receive such care .... If [statutory] obstacles had not impacted upon [th e pa t ie nt 's] fre edom to m ak e a
constitutionally protected decision , if the y had merely made the phy sic ian 's
work more laborious or less independent without any impact on th e patie nt,
this would not have violate d th e Constitution. 20

Parents do have a right to familial privacy and to the care and
custody of their children, but that right is not so broad that it gives
them the freedom to bring about their children's deaths by deliberate
liledical neglect. Parents may not rely on the Constitution to inflict
serious harm on their children ~ Thus, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 21 .
the Supreme Court held that parental rights could not overcome the
government's interest in protecting children from burdensome and
- exploitive work through the child labor laws. In Jehovah 's Witnesses v.
K~ng County Hospital, 22 it summarily held that a parent could not
-Withhold a blood transfusion needed to save a child's life.
. It may be argued that_the constitutional right of privacy protects an
llldividual's right to · die in the sense of a right to refuse medical treatment, at least in some circumstances. 23 Whatever application this view
rnay have to a competent individual or to a once-competent individual
~hose desires can be inferred from his or her views while competent,
It has no application to an incompetent individual who has never
~n competent to make such decisions - such as a handicapped
lllfant.
The decision of the highest court of New York in In re Storar, 24
!bakes the distinction clear. In Storar, the New York Court of
Appeals was concerned with two individuals : Brother Fox, who had
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been a competent man of normal intelligence and c apacity i
surgical complication led to his comat ose incompeten cy, an c
Storar, who was an instit utionalized and profoundly retarded 5_
old man who had never had a m ental age of more t han a b.
months.25 Brother Fox 's religious superior sought judicial p em
to disconnec t his respirator , while Storar's mother sought to p
the giving of lifesaving blood transfusions to her son.
The Storar court drew a sharp distinction between the tw o c
held that " clear and convinc ing evidence" prove d that Broth (
while competent, had indicated his desire that treat m ent of tl·
at issue should not be provided to him . On the basis of the c<
law " right of a patient to control t he course of his medi ca
ment," the court held that Brother Fox should be r emoved fr
respirator. 26 With regard to John Storar, on the other hand , th
declared that his treat ment should have been ordered:
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J o hn Storar ... was always t o ta ll y inca pa ble of und ers t a nd ing or m a k ~ a
reasoned decision about m edi cal treatm e nt. Thus it is un rea list ic to a U
to determin e wh e th er he would wa n t to con ti nue po te nti all y life prol o
treatm ent if he w e re compe te nt . As one o f t he ex p erts test ifie d "
hearing, tha t would be similar to askin g wh ether "if it snow ed a ll Sll ' n er
would it th e n b e winte r?" 27

The Storar court held that in such circumstances " a cour t
o uld
not ... allow an incompetent patient to bleed to death beca u s· ·-;o rneone, even someone as close as a parent or a sibling, feels t h a: ·. h is is
best .... "28 Similarly, to say that a parent could u se "su b:-- tt uted
judgment" to exercise a disabled infant's " right to die " would < n ount
to the acceptance of involuntary euthanasia.
Two recent cases have run counter to these general prin cJ.J les. In
the Indiana case publicly known as " Infant Doe " (the r ea c Lio n to
which ultimately resulted in the Jan. 12, 1984 regulatio ns of the
Health and Human Services under Section 504 of the Reha b :li tation
Act of 1973) and in the New York case known as " Baby J a n;· Doe,"
the parents were allowed t o reject medical treatment for t h e l·hildren
involved, even though in the Indiana case it meant starva twn and
death within six days and , in the New York case , life l imited to
approximately two to four years with an unoperat ed lesio n o f t he
spinal cord. Why is this so? Is the law changing so that parents maY
now determine t hat if the qual'ity of the child 's life with t re a t ment IS
unacceptable to them they may reject treatment and allow the child
to die? Have we reached the stage sought by Duff and Ca mpbell in
their famous 197 3 paper calling for such changes in the law?
If work ing o ut t h ese dile mmas in ways suc h as t hose we su ggest is in viola-

ti on of t he law , w e believe the la w should be chan ged . 2 9

Can it fairly be said of the New York and Indiana cases tha t t he laW
now allows parents with severely handicapped children sole discretion
in treatment choices for their child?
50
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Infant Doe
On April 9 , 1982, Infant Doe was born at Bloomington Hospital at
Bloomington, Indiana. He was born with a surgically correctable condition known as tracheoesophageal fistula that prevented him from
. ·orally ingesting food and water . However, he could have received
fluids and nourishment through intravenous feeding.
Although Bloomington Hospital was not adequately equipped to
perform the surgery necessary to enable Infant Doe to eat normally,
nearby Riley Children 's Hospital was equipped to handle t his kind of
surgery a·n d employed an excellent pediatric surgeon. This lifesaving
surgery, while difficult, has been performed since 1941 and has a
probable success rate of bett er than 90% if performed wit hin t he first
24 hours of birth. 30 If the surgery and nourishment were withheld,
Infant Doe would certainly die.
Despite the favorable success rate for surgery and the certainty of
death without it, the obstetrician who delivered Infant Doe offered
Mr. and Mrs. Doe the alternative of doing nothing to save the life of
their child. He offered this as an alternative course of " treatment"
because Infant Doe, in addition to having a tracheoesophageal fistula,
also had Down's syndrome.
Feeling that a "minimally acceptable" quality of life could not be
Obtained by an infant with Down's syndrome and that it would be in
the best interests of the infant, their two other children at home, and
their family entity as a whole if Infant Doe died, Mr. and Mrs. Doe
decided that no corrective surgery should be performed and that no
food or water should be administered. 3l
On April 10, 1982, a hearing concerning Infant Doe was held at
Bloomington Hospital before Judge John Baker of the Monroe Circuit
Court. The hearing was held at the request of Bloomington Hospital,
Which sought guidance from the court .
Although no record of the April 10 hearing was made, Judge
~er's declaratory judgment of April 12 indicates that the obstetriCian testified at the hearing and recommended that Infant Doe be kept
· at Bloomington Hospital and that he not be given lifesaving surgery,
food, or water. 32
In making his recommendation, the obstetrician relied on the fact
that although surgery woulq correct the tracheoesophageal fistula and
therefore allow the child to survive, it could not cure any mental
retardation associated with Down 's syndrome. Accordingly, the
obstetrician testified that even if corrective surgery were successful,
Infant Doe could not attain a " minimally acceptable quality of life. " 33
Three other physicians also testified. They all recommended that
Infant Doe be transferred immediately to Riley Children 's Hospital for
COrrective surgery. 34
In a hearing held April 13 in a companion case, brought by the
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Monroe County Prosecutor to secure treatment for Infant De
testimony was "substantially the same" as in the April 10 hea r
which no record exists. 35 In the April 13 hearing, in contrast
obstetrician's testimony, a pediatrician testified that it was im p
to determine the severity of mental retardation in a newbo rn
with Down's syndrome. He also testified that there is a broad n :
IQs for Down's syndrome children; they may range from St
retarded children with IQs of 20 to 30, all the way into th e '
intelligence range. 36 The obstetrician did not dispute this test
Indeed, he agreed with it, stating, "As [has been] indicated
can be absolutely sure of the degree of retardation at the t
birth. "37 Despite this, the obstetrician insisted that Infant Do1
not attain a " minimally acceptable" quality of life :
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Both [of the othe r phys icians J we re pre pared to tell the pare n ts t o ~ ive
them only one option. To send th e child to Ril ey Hospital for surgery
.I
in sist e d upon giving the parents a choice. I felt that this was not an ade ate
descr ip ti on of t h e s ituation . I insiste d upon telling the par·e nts, poin ti n o ut
to the parents tha t if this surgery were performed and if it we re succ • sful
and the child s urvived , that this still would not b e a normal child. T 1 1t it
would st ill b e a mongoloid , a Down 's sy ndrome child with all the p r o I ms
t h at eve n th e b es t of t h e m have. Th at they did have another alternative ' 1ic h
was to do no t hing. In which case th e child would proba bly li ve only a n tter
of severa l da ys a nd would di e of pn e umoni a probabl y .. . . Some o f
ese
childre n , as I indicated in m y testimony to Judge Ba k er are m ere i o bs.
Some of t h em , most of them , eve ntually lea rn to walk a nd most of
em
eve ntually lea rn to ta lk .... (T J hi s ta lk consists o f a si ngl e word or •· J m ~
t h in g of this so rt at best. I h ave n eve r personall y known the tr ue D o w n s
Syndrome c hild t hat was a bl e to be gai nfull y employ e d in anythin g ,)t her
t h a n a s h e ltered works hop , with constant supervision , in other w • d s, ,a
c hild that c ould be self-suppor t ing. I've nev er h e ard of such a D o w n s
Sy ndrom e child. I've n ever h eard of a Down 's Syndrom e child tha t c o uld
li ve a lone . They require at best c onsta nt attention .. . . These ch ild re n are
qui tf' inca p a bl e of telling us wh at t h ey fe e l, and what they se n se, an d so
011 . 38

On April 12, 1982, the court issued a declaratory judgmen t ordering Bloomington Hospital to allow Mr. and Mrs. Doe to cho ose _a
course of "treatment" for Infant Doe that was certain to result in hiS
death. 39
Two orders were issued by trial courts in these cases. The first was
the declaratory judgment issued April 12, 1982. The secon d was an
order dismissing the companion case entered on April14, 19 82. Both
orders are included in their e ntirety in the Appendix foll owing the
referen ces for this article.
Baby Jane Doe
On Oct. 11 , 1!)83, Baby Jane Doe was born in a small hosp1·ta 1 inf
Port Jefferso n , N.Y. -to She had spina bifida, involving the fai lure 0
the spinal column to seal in the spinal cord completely , and hydro52
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cephalus, or excessive fluid surrounding her brain. The standard treatment for this condition is surgery to close the spine and shunt the
fluid from the brain. Although they received an initial recommendation for surgery and transferred her to the state university hospital at
Stony Brook, Long Island, because it had the proper surgical facilities,
.her parents, on the advice of Dr. George Newman, soon decided to
deny consent for these measures. Someone inside the hospital contacted attorney Lawrence Washburn, who applied to the New York
Supreme Court (a low level court of general jurisdictio n) for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem to argue on behalf of surgery for
the child.41 Justice Tannenbaum appointed William Weber to that
post, and a hearing was held on Oct. 19 and 20, at the conclusion of
which the court ordered the surgery to be performed. 42 The ruling
was immediately appealed to the appellate division, which stayed the
order and, after hearing arguments, on Oct . · 21 reversed t he lower
court's ruling. In a narrowly drawn and fact-based opinion, the unanimous court affirmed the authority of the lower court to entertain the
question, but reread the record as indicating that the parents simply
chose one among two courses of risky medical treatment.

' '

[T J his is not a case where a n infant is being d e pri ve d of medi cal trea tm ent
to achieve a quick and supposedly m erci ful d eath . R ather, it IS a situation
where the parents have chosen one course of appropriate medical treatm ent
over another. 43

Guardian ad litem Weber then appealed to the state's highest court,
the Court of Appeals. In an opinion that can be described as caustic,
the court dismissed the case, holding that the interveners on behalf of
the child, whose actions it called "offensive," 44 had no standing to
challenge the parents' private decision . Since New York's child protection agency concurred with the parents' decision , the high court essentially ruled that intervention to save the child's life was impossible. 45
_That ruling prompted the United States Justice Depart ment to
hnng suit in federal District Court on Nov. 17 to obtain Baby Jane's
. medical records under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197 3,
Which prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in federally
~ded hospitals. Long Island 's Stony Brook Hospital had refused to
give government civil rights investigators the child's medical records
subsequent to the OCt. 19-20 lower court hearings. The district court
ruled against the Justice Department, and that ruling was affirmed by
the Second Circuit of Appeals. 46 We shall return to these rulings after
c_onsidering the litigation surrounding the federal " Baby Doe " regulations.
First, however it will be useful to examine more carefully the facts
the Baby Jan~ Doe case. The contrast between the pubhc perception of those facts, as a result of inaccuracies spread by press reports
and by the courts themselves and the true condition of the child
Provides a classic case study df the way in which dehumanizing fal-

~f
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lacies about the disabled color our judgment and foster our pre:
In March of 1984, after winning on every level in their fi
avoid surgery for their daughter, Baby Jane Doe's parents d
their minds. They agreed to permit surgery to install a shunt f
hydrocephaly.47 Her spinal lesion, having healed (a rare, b1
unprecedented, happenstance in the absence of spinal closure su
she left the hospital for her parents' home on April 4 . At the t
greatest public attention to her plight, amidst the flurry of litiga
October and November, 1983, the universal public expectati1
not nearly so rosy.
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Statements by Press
Press reports, columns, editorials, and court opinions statec lmost
without equivocation that Baby Jane Doe would be severely n 1rded,
bedridden, and live only to age 20 if given the surgery. 48 ' et an
examination of the testimony at the lower court hearing led Jne of
the nation's leading experts on the treatment of spina bifi •a, Dr.
David MeLone, chief of pediatric neurosurgery at Chicago 's Cr' ldren 's
Memorial Hospital and associate professor of surgery at Nort h ·estern
University Medical School, to conclude, " If you take our ex} ' rience
of a child [in Baby Jane Doe 's described medical condition ] would
predict that the child in our hands would have a normal intf' ligence
and would be a community ambulator .. . [walking] probab:y with
some bracing." 49
Testifying at the lower court hearings, which are still t he onlY
detailed source of information on the child's medical condit1on, Dr.
Newman, a neurologist at Stony Brook Hospital , said that the child 's
head at birth "was abnormally small," which gave her " virtually a 100
percent chance of being retarded."50 But Dr. Albert Butler, chief of
neurological surgery at the hospital, Newman's superior , and the onlY
other physician to testify in the case, agreed with a statement that the
baby's 31-centimeter head circumference was "within normal
measurements for a baby of that size." 51
Dr. MeLone, who has treated over 1 ,000 children with spina bifida,
agrees with Butler: "Approximately 15 to 20 percent of t he c hildre~
born with spina bifida have a head circumference in that [ 31 cent!·
meter] range, and that is perfectly compatible with norm al iritellec·
tual development." In fact, said MeLone, some children in that range
of head size are among the " very brightest " of individuals with spina
bifida. "It's the child who has the extremely large head who is at risk
for having decreased intellectual development. It's act ually back·
wards," he said of the prognosis. 52
Newman testified that the parents decided it would be unkind to
allow the child to undergo surgery, because " [ o] n the basis of th.e
combinations of the malformations that are present in this child she 15
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not likely to ever achieve any meaningful interaction with her environmen~ •. nor ever to achieve any interpersonal relationships, the very
quahties that we consider hurrian . . . . " 53 Newman also asserted " It's
unlike~y that she is going to develop any cognitive skills, " 54 and that
the child would have positive experience of " nothing whatsoever" on
the cognitive scale. 55 But Dr. Butler asserted , " I think we have to
reasonably expect that this. child might be able to sit up , look around ,
be aware of parents or good friends .. . ." ?6 Butler, who with Newm~, ~avored the parents' decision, also contradicted Newman by
affrrmmg that the child would, at least to a limited extent be able to
.
'
expenenc~ emotions such as sadness and joy, if she lived long enough. 57
. In cases similar to Baby Jane Doe 's, Dr. Butler stated in the Nov. 9
~ue of Newsda y , that it is possible that the child " with special educatlo~ could be able to feed himself, talk some, have fun in a very
rudimentary kindergarten-type class but not necessarily go home with
much information. " 58
The Arnold-Chiari brain malformation to which Dr. Newman's grim
prognosis referred involves a compression of the brain stem. 59 This, as
Well as a dilation of the brain 's ventricles, were measured by an ultrasound sonogram test. Dr. Butler testified that the test classified the
dilation of the child's ventricles as " a moderate effect ." 60
"Would it be a fair statement to say that at this very moment we
really don 't know the full extent if any of brain damage? " Butler was
asked. "Precisely, no," he responded . 61
"All of these children," says MeLone, " have a brain malformation .
The spina bifida child, virtually 100% of those children have the Chiari
~be brai~ ~alfor~ation, whic~ is a ~rof~und brai': mal~ormation .
owever, It Is a bram malformatiOn which Is compatible with normal
~velopm~nt function." MeLone said, "Virtually 98 percent of these
ds at birth will have a dilated ventricular system and 15 to 20
percent. of those kids will have a small head, and still it's perfectly
compatible with normal intelligence." 62
·
recPr_ess accounts have repeatedly stated that Baby Jane, if she
~Ived the necessary surgery, was destined to be " bedridden. " Testi.
g on Baby Jane's probable daily routine after the proposed surDr. Newman said, " It would likely consist of lying in bed, being
e Probably by bottle. ·. .. "6 3 Later in the hearing however Newman•5
.
.
·
'
'
fr
own wntten prognosis for the child was quoted by Dr. Butler
001
t~e medical records: " The prognosis offered with appropriate
reservation was for probable . .. walking with bracing .. .. "64
MeLone agrees with the more optimistic of Newman 's duel prog~OSes. "If you take our experience of a child with a head circumferm~e of 31 ~entimeters with a sl~~htly dilate~ ventricular system, L-3
m~:r level .m the lower extremities [all ascnbed to Baby Jane in the
have cal testim~ny] would predict that that child in our hands would
a normal mtelhgence and would be a community ambulator ...

r;{·
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[walking] probably with some bracing. " Wheelchair confinem< t for
such a child whose spina bifida condition was aggressively
·ated
within the first hours after birth , says MeLone, would not e · n be
anticipated. 65
Media reports similarly appear to have distorted Baby J an! Joe's
life expectancy. Although New York trial court Ju stice Melvyn men·
baum in his oral opinion summarized the testimony as pred t ing a
maximum lifespan of 20 years even with surgery, Newman · tes ti mony, upon which the reco llection was based, reads so m ewha t :ifferently . " How long might the child live after surgery?" l\'ew m 1 was
asked. "There is really no way of plac ing a limit on it if th e su ery ts
performed, " he answered. 66 "Could it cont.:eivably be twenty · ·a rs'!"
asked the cross examiner. "Yes," Newman answered , " ... 20 c'ar~ is
possible.,. 6 7 f'\o physician ever claimed, however, that 20 yea were
the outside limit of Baby Jane 's life expectancy.
Media assertions that the child would be in constant pain a l of her
life apparently derive from Newman's testimony that. as wit o ther
children, "she is capable of experiencing pain. " 68 Speculatm g Jl1 thP
possible infections, commonly contracted ·a nd overeume by tJeople
with spina bifida, that Baby Jane might develop, Newman tl •n said
that to perform the lifesaving surgery for t he child "would · tcrease
the total pain that the child would experience." 69
This is obvious in the sense that a longer life includes mo r,' of all
life 's experiences, including pain. But the evidence is that • hildren
with Baby Jane Doe's handicap do not experience significan t ly more
pain than normal children. Contrary to editorial versions of th P child's
story Dr. Butler in Newsday stated that for a child similarl y , it uated
to Ba,by Jane, "certainly there would be little expectation of pain.·· ·o
In another apparent contradiction, Dr. Newman claimed 1 hat the
child's arms were spastic. 71 Butler, however. agreed with t he statement that the child's upper extremities had '·good reflexes in relatiOn
to nervous system testing." 72 He testified that "the child ca n movt'
[her arms] around, at least to the extent that would be expe <" ted of a
nonaffected baby." 73
Custodial care which involved failure to drain the excess fl u id in the
child's head and to close the lesion , or meningomyelocel e. on th~
child's spine was described in the hearings as "conservative trea tment
by the parents' lawyer, Paul 'Gianelli . 71 MeLone, how ever, cMbiders
this care to leave the spina bifida condition •· untreated. ,. Writing 10
the recent anthology Infanticide and th e Handicapped N e wborn .
MeLone said " If by ' untreated ' one m ea ns providing o nly suppo r~tve
care for the child in the form of proper nouri shment and ap p ropnate
medications but withholding surgical therapy , then the mortali ty ratP
[in the first two years of life is] 60-80 percent. " 75 The decision not
to treat was made on the basis of the Lorber criteria, nam l:'d fora
British neurosurgeon who, Newman said, promulgated "certain critena
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whic h ... would predict a virtually invariable poor outcome" for certain infants with spina bifida. 76 But Dr . MeLone asserts, " I think that
that criteria has been proven over and over in institutions. in this
country to be completely invalid ." 77
Did the decision to deny the corrective measures place Baby Jane
. - "in eminent [sic ] danger, or in risk of eminent [sic ] danger?" "No,"
-Newman responded. 7 8 Questioning Butler, however, the judge noted,
"You have said that there is an imminent danger of infection, with the
onset of infection the child will be lost, is that a fair statement?"
Butler answered, "That's correct." 79 Earlier Butler was asked , "Would
the operation ... remove the danger of infection or the risk of infection?" "[S 1ignificantly," Butler responded . 80 Dr . Keuscamp, the first
neurosurgeon in charge of the infant 's care, reco mmended immediate
transfer to Stony Brook Hospital , where the surgery could be performed . The parents o riginally consented to transfer for the surgery,81 but, under Dr . Newman's advice, changed t heir minds. Keuscamp thereafter withdrew from the case "in light of his fee ling that
the surgery should be performed. " 82
Did the requested corrective procedures constitute ordinary medical
care for a child in Baby Jane's condition? Yes, answered Dr. Butler,
again con tradicting Newman. "In the sense that what we do most commonly or how we most commonly treat an infant who presents with
these groups of problems ... . In that sense, in most instances the
surgical procedure is performed to repair the myelomeningocele and
then either at the same operation or shortly thereafter to perform the
shunting procedure ."8a The Newsday interview with Butler, moreover, described him as one who " favors surgery in cases medically
identical to those of Baby Jane because he believes such infants have
far more potential than other Stony Brook physicians have predicted
for the patient." 84
·
The picture which emerges of Baby Jane Doe is that, far from being
a "hard case ," she is really one of the better cases in terms of prognosis for a high " quality of life." Her saga illustrates the profound
unreason that an openness to discrimination fosters: a willingness,
even an eagerness, to believe the worst about a minority in order
consciously or subconsciously to justify a denial of equal protection.
History has taught over and over again how this willingness systematIcally leads to distortion in the view the majority holds of the minority, the acceptance of in~cc uracies and stereotypes which in turn,
reinforce the discriminatory attitude. This cycle, in which discrimin_ation and failure of perception reinforce and feed each other, step
by step leads to an ever expanding class of victims and a gradually
increasing degree of gravity of the wrongs the majority is led to perpetrate upon t he minority. This ignoble tradition is carried out fully in
the Baby Jane Doe case . For in the space of five months, different
levels of the courts progressed from opinions which simply got t he
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facts wrong while asserting the right and duty of society to inte;
to save the lives of the disabled, through opinions virulent in
denunciation of any who sought to intervene, to an opinion
disclaimed any authority to intervene at all. An understanding of
opinions, however, requires that we first examine Section 504 ar
"Baby Doe Rule.''

ene
1eir
hat
tese
the

The Baby Doe Rule and the President's Commission Report
The well-publicized April, 1982 denial of food and surgE 1 to
Bloomington, Indiana's " Infant Doe " prompted President Reaf:
to
issue a statement on April 30, 1982, in which he directed HIto
notify health care providers of the applicability of Section 504 " the
Rehabilitation Act of 197 3 to discriminatory denial of food or 1edical treatment to disabled infants. 85 On May 18, 1982, HH S · sued
such a notice to the country's 7,000 hospitals, an act denounc d by
hospital and medical associations. 86
It was not until March 7, 1983, however, that HHS issued ~ gulations dealing with the problem . .'! 7 This first version of thr rules
required posting of a notice in each hospital ward likely tc treat
disabled newborns. The notice stated that " Discriminatory Fail· re to
Feed and Care for Handicapped Infants in This Facility is Prob, ited
by Federal Law." It gave 800-368-1019 as the number of a t o!l free
24-hour hotline through which confidentially to report susr ected
denial of "food or customary medical treatment" to the HHS ffice
of Civil Rights (OCR). The regulations also allowed federal investigators to visit the hospital at any time, not just during "normal business
hours," and to act to enforce compliance without the 10-day waiting
period required in other civil rights investigations.
Also in March, 1983, the President's Commission for the Stu d y of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavior Research
released its report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment,
with a chapter on "Seriously Ill Newborns."88
The President's Commission divided the problem into three
categories:
1) where treatment is available which would clearly benefit the
child;
2) where all treatment is futile;
3) where the probable benefits to an infant from different choices
are quite uncertain.
.
Concluding that in c1ll cases th~ standard or norm for treatmen~ ts
the best interests of the child as seen from the child's own perspecttve
(not that of the parents), the Commission concluded that as to category one, a very strict standard is appropriate : " Such permanent han·
dicaps justify a decision not to provide life sustaining treatm ent onlY
when they are so severe that continued existence would not be a net
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benefit to the infant .... [The standard] excludes consideration of
the negative effects of an iPlpaired child's life on other persons,
including parents, siblings, and society.'' 89
·
As to category two, where all treatment is clearly futile, omission of
. "treatment" is clearly legally and ethically justifiable.
A physician is not mandated by Jaw to render useless treatment. By
"useless' is meant that continuation of the therapy cannot and does
not improve the prognosis for recovery. Even if the therapy is necessary to maintain stability, such therapy should not be mandatory
where ti:)e ultimate prognosis is hopeless. This does not mean that
ordinary means of life-support, such as food and drink, can be discontinued merely because the ultimate prognosis is hopeless. It does
mean, however, that physicians can exercise sound medical judgment
and common sense in determining whether treatment is efficacious
and, if it is not, then to cease the treatment. When the patient's illness
is terminal and the end is near, society, through the physician, should
be concerned with easing the difficult burden of death with loving
care and concern. This goal is not achieved through officious deathbed burdens such as sustained heroic treatment, flawed living wills, or
mandatory court approval for decisions that are best guided by medical judgment.
The physician who withdraws treatment from the terminally ill
patient whose death is imminent should not be held criminally or
civilly liable for such conduct when this care unduly prolongs life of
the dying patient without holding out any ~:easonable hope of benefit.
The withdrawal of treatment that only briefly forestalls imminent and
inevitable death does not legally cause the death of the patient, since
such conduct merely allows the underlying disease or illness to run its
inevitable course.
We speak here of a limited class of cases, however. When referring
to "treatment," we mean a regimen of medical care, as distinguished
from ordinary care such as food and drink. Nourishment and palliative
care should be given to all patients, even to those terminally-ill and
from whom treatment has been withdrawn. When referring to "useless" treatment or "hopeless" cases, we mean those situations in which
the decision to withdraw treatment is in essence a recognition that
nothing more can be ·done for the patient, that the only sensible
course is to withdraw treat.ment. The physician cannot be held liable
for death here because he has not caused the patient to die. Rather, he
simply has recognized, in exercise of sound medical judgment, that
d~ath from this disease or condition is inevitable and imminent.
As to the third category -ambiguous cases-the Commission properly acknowledges that the difficulty in these cases arises from factual
uncertainties. It looks to the creation of objective medical standards
learned after the new medical area of neonatology has had the opportunity to grapple with such difficult issues: It also proposes procedural
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recommendations ,uch as Infant Care Co mmittees so t hat dec i ms
t·orwerning th e treatment o f severely handi capped new bo rns are . tde
aftP r ,·u nsult a tion. with prospects for retrospective review. ~o It the
,·ontt·x t o f thi s, it c riti cizes t he " Baby Doe" regulations as u ·arra niPdl y " adw rsarial. · ·~ r
HowPw r. 1 htJ important observation he re is that the Commi s ~ n h
o f t ht> upin1un that most cases involving treatment ch01ces f(l the
severely handit·ap!Je d ne wborn will fall in category one. Th is
so
si nce . th e Com mission says, th e !Ja rent s may not "rt'jf'L't t n ·a 1 Pill
that is relraiJiy ex !Je <'t f'd lo benefit a sPrio usly ill 1wwborn ::.u ~ tantiall y as"' u .~ua/1 .\ / r ue t/ lt/e mn he .~al'ed" tPm as!S
acJdPd) . ":1 Dow n '::. syndrumt' r:. "1-l'~ c· rf J('a lly t•:-., ·ludPd IJy t hP Co • m b ·
~ ron as gro und s for refu srn g treatmPnt. \ t.l
:Yi eanwhile . th e first " Ra hy U op" nJgulaticn wa:- t·hallt>nged 1 Dis·
trll'l of Co lumbia fedPral distrit'l t·o urt by t hP Amerit·an ,-\('ad ~· · of
l' t•dia tri('s and other medical groups . On April 1-L l~H;·L jud g· GPr·
hard Gt>sell Pnjoined th e rules . L·a llmg them "arbitrary and caprit )us··
and rulmg that the re was insuffic ient Pv idenc_e of an emt>rgen c ade4Uate to waive the fiU - day co mm Pnl period norm all y requirPd l .- tht>
.\dmini strative Procedure .\!'1 lwfon' proposPd fed eral regulati o , can
tak ~> l'ffect. " 1
In n' spon se . o n .July 5. 1983. HHS puhii shPd as a proposal a - l' ond
ve rsio n of the regulati o n,."" Th ey rt>du cecJ the size of the no ce to
8 '12' ' x 11" (from 8' '~ .. x 1-l" In t he ongmal rules ). and required · nat it
be post ed only 111 nurses · station s. nut wards. (A principal cr it il' ~ m of
th e original regulation had bee n that janitors, vi:.itors, or oth er medically untrain ed persons might hP induct>d by a public noti ce u , make
frivol o us and harassi ng co mplaints. ) They added a set of re qui rements
fo r sta tt' l·hild protection agf'n('ies rP< ·eiving ft>dP ral fin an cial as~ is·
tance: the age nc ies would have to devPlop written pruced urPs for
dealing with treatm ent denial rt>por ts on a ti mely basis , including,
·· where appropriate.'' on - si te investigation, and mak e prov is1o n for
see king timPly cou rt order.-; "to l'ompel the provision of nPcessarY
noun shmt•nt and medi ca l trPatm ent . •· ~" · They rPquired state agencies
to notify the Office for Civi l Rights of eac h report received an d o f t he
~te ps taken to investiga te and dispose of t he report. ThPy al so add ed an
a!J pendix desc ribing, with exampl es , th e di stinction bet wee n an
acce ptable decisiOn not to at te m pt futil e t reatm ent and an unac.cep·
table decision "for those handi capped infants ... who could live if
given trea tm ent fo r a life-t hreateni ng co nge nital anomaly . .. to with·
hold trl'at men t whi ch is based o n t he infant 's handicap rather t han on
a mt'dil·al ju dgment . . . _" H'
Durin g thl' 60 -day l'O mm Pnt period , 97 .5r;, o f t h e 16,33 1 co mments
rel'e ived ~ uppo rt f'd 't he proposed regulation . ~R H owever, hos p ital and
physic ian groups v<•hemPntl y denounc ed t he m and th e Am erican
.\ cademy of Pediatrics proposed a d etai led alternati ve whi ch would
()0
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provide for no applicability of Section 504 but, based on Medicaid
and Medicare regulatory authority, would require each hospital (or
groups of nearby hospitals) to create an " Infant Bioethical Review
Board." Such boards would be vested with authority to decide contested cases of denial of food or treatment. The American Medical
· · Association, however, opposed the notion of any government inter. vention, including government mandated hospital review boards. 99
In November, 1983, according to Felicity Barringer of the Washington Post, "Surgeon General C . Everett Koop, on a trip with Health
and Human Services Secretary Margaret M. Heckler, told her that it
would be easier to take the heat for the controversial rule if he had
some part in writing it. ' It's all yours,' Heckler responded, ac cording
to someone familiar with the conversation."Ioo Koop then sponsored
negotiations which included medical organizations and disability rights
organizations.
The compromise result of those negotiations was publicly
announced on Jan. 9 as the third and final set of regulations. 101
The final rule is far more elaborate than its predecessors. The
requirement that notice be posted is retained, although its size is
~educed to 5" x 7" and it now need not be posted either in wards or
m nurses' stations; it may be posted someplace "where nurses and
other medical professionals can see it," such as a cafeteria or locker
roo~, yet which is not " in area(s ) where parents of infant patients will
~e It." 102 However, there are two alternative notices, both changed
m wording from that used in the previously published version of t he
regulations. Each is now headed " Principles of Treatment of Disabled
Infants." "Notice B" states "Federal law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of handicap. Under this law , nourishment and medically
bene f"al
1c1 treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical judgments) ·should not be withheld from handicapped infants
~lel~ on the basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical
~P81rment." It lists the telephone numbers of the state child protective semce
· and of the HHS OCR toll-free 2 4 -hour number , pledges
that the identity of callers will be kept confidential and notes that
retaliation against callers is prohibited. 103
'
"~otice A" is similar, but it begins, "It is the policy of t his hospit al,
consiStent with federal law" and then states the same standard of care.
Above the number of the st~te and federal agencies, it lists the number
of a "hospital contact point ," either " for further information, or to
~port suspected noncompliance ." 104 Hospitals may use "Notice B"
~/hey 1) officially adopt the standard of care described in t h e notice,
agree to maintain confidentiality of those who make reports and
~ot to retaliate against them (although a " hospital need not .. . forego
h an~ement prerogatives with respect to anyone who might abuse the
~SPital's procedures by, for example, willfully making false or maliCIOUs calls," and 3) implement "a procedure for review of treat-
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ment deliberations and decisions to which the notice applies, sw as
(but not limited to) an Infant Care Review Committee."105
A model committee is outlined in the regulations, foll o ing
basically the format ·proposed by the American Academy of Pe iatrics, but everything suggested about the committee by the regula· ons
is purely advisory. Its composition and procedures - and ven
whether there is to be a committee at all, so long as there is ,me
procedure for review of treatment deliberations- are left entire 1 to
the discretion of each hospital. 106
Appended to the final rule is a set of guidelines for HHS inve ~ iga
tions . "Unless impracticable," if a hospital has an Infant Care R• view
Committee, federal investigators will wait 24 hours after recei' -t of
any report of denial of treatment to allow that committee to co1 ider
the case and make its analysis and recommendations. An HHS m• -i ical
consultant will contact the Committee. After receiving the Cor· mittee's report, and with input from the medical consultant, the ir. ·estigators will determine whether an on-site visit is necessary. The s1: plementary information published with the recommendation emph tsizes
that the Office of Civil Rights "undertakes a careful screen i•1g of
complaints in an effort to avoid unnecessary on-site inv• stiga·
tions." 10 7 Should such an investigation be authorized, the first step
of the investigators will be to meet with the Infant Care Review
Committee.
Before promulgation of the final rule, disability rights groups had
emphasized the importance of securing a physical examination of the
child by the medical consultant. For example, in its comment letter,
the Spina Bifida Association of America had emphasized, "The key to
effective enforcement is securing an independent medical exam ination
of children allegedly being denied treatment, by a physician or medical team both skilled in modem treatment techniques and co m mitted
to the equal treatment principle .... The only way to ensure effective
enforcement is to give disability rights groups like SBAA the a bility to
recommend which expertise centers and expert consultants are used
by the regional OCR offices to conduct the independent medical
examinations." 108 The Department firmly rebuffed this co n cept of
the role of the medical consultant. "It is important that all interested
groups understand the precise · and limited role of the OCR medical
consultants. Their function is not ... to conduct a personal , independent examination of the infant . . .. " 109 Instead, the Department said,
it is only to examine the medical records, in some cases discuss the
matter with the attending physician, and then give investigators "an
opinion as to whether medically beneficial treatment was provided ." 110
The standard of care to be enfqrced is set forth in "Interpretative
guidelines relating 'to the applicability of this part to health care for
handicapped infants: ... . [H) ealth care providers may not, solely on
the basis of present or anticipated physical or mental impairments of
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an infant, withhold treatment or nourishment from the infant who, in
spite of such impairments, will medically benefit from the treatment
or nourishment." 111 The guidelines emphasize that "treatment that
will do no more than temporarily prolong the act of dying of a terminally ill infant is not considered treatment that will medically bene. fit the infant," 112 and that " [ i] n determining whether certain possible treatments will be medically beneficial to an infant, reasonable
medical judgments in selecting among alternative courses of treatment
will be respected." na
Much of the effectiveness of Section 504's enforcement will, of
course, depend on how " medically beneficial treatment" is construed,
and on precisely how wide a variance is tolerated as "reasonable medical judgment. " The supplementary information keyed to these guidelines places considerable emphasis on the " principle of respecting
reasonable medical judgments;" the Department will not "seek to
engage in second-guessing of reasonable medical judgments regarding
medically beneficial care." 11 4 However, it is stated that " the Department also recognizes that not every opinion expressed by a doctor
automatically qualifies as a reasonable medical judgment," and gives
the example of " a doctor's opinion that available corrective surgery to
save the life of a Down's syndrome infant should be withheld." 115 The
section of the supplementary information purporting to d eal with
"Medically Beneficial Treatment" does not explain that term ; 116
however, another section is quite helpful and positive.
[I] f . . . surge ry would be m edicall y be neficial , in that it would b e likely ,
in the exercise of reasonable m edical judgmen t , to bri ng about its inte nde d
result of avoiding . . : fata l co nseque nc es, t h e n failure to p er form t h e su rgery because of t h e a n ticipated impairments in future life offe nds section
504, as the withholding of su rge ry is because of t h e ha ndicap and in spite of
the infant 's being qualifi e d to rece.i ve the s u rgery . 11 7

. There is one significant and troubling omission from the interpretati~e guidelines. The corresponding appendix in the proposed rules contained a paragraph which read :
[T Jhe · basic provision o f nourishment, fl u ids, an d routine nu rsi ng care is a
fundamental m atter o f human dignity , no t an option for m edical judgm ent.
Even if a handic a ppe d infant faced imminent and unavo idable d eath , no
. health care provide r should take upon itself to cau se dea t h b y starvation or
dehydration . Routin e nursing care to provi de comfort and cleanliness is
required to resp ect t h e dignity of suc h a n in fant. To d e ny these forms of
basic care to ha ndi capped indi vidua ls would constitute di scri mina t ion contrary to section 5 04 . 118

.No trace of such a view appears in t he final regulations. The supplementary information notes that " The American Society for Parenteral
~d- Enteral Nutrition stated t hat although there are no circumstances
~Ustlfying 'withholding oral feeding through a working digestive tract
lll any patient capable of digesting food , in whol e or in part,' there
may be 'limited circumstances ' in which not providing nourishment
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through intravPnous mf'ans ·may be appropriatf' .' ·· 11 9 Wit!" ut
directly re plying to that <·omm ent, the Department's " Rf'spo 1 p ''
states, " The imprudent:f' uf seeking to speculatE' on the out ~:om o f
applying Section 50 I in a widf' variety of spPcific factual l"in m·
stances was underscon>d by somP of the <'ommPnts rf'cf'ive d ... and n~s
on to say that. in balancing "the utility of providing som<· exam)J l• to
assist in und!:'rstand ing the analytical framPwork of t ht• stat ut p .. nd
··thf' nt> ~·d to allow individual attt•ntion to spel·Ific fa1 ·tual ci n m~tann•s ... It wa,.; decided I o list only "f'xamples dt>aling with I>o n\
syndrome. spma bifida. an<·nc ephaly. and PxtrPmt• pr!'maturity . ~ ~~~
Tht> unfortunatt · Im)Jlication is that, in contrast with its ~>m p l .ti1·
assE·rt ion of a un ivt>r..,al duty to pro vide n utn tion en unl"!at t>d 1r 1hP
propose d rult>!--. I II IS now regards at least some den ial of 111t rav e ,w,
fet>d1ng to bt> within th!' gray arPa to bf' decid<>d casP by ··a s t' .
L"niiPd

Sta/P.~

ol .- \ rne rica

t" .

UniL'ersi/y Hospitul

The .. Baby Dllt'.. regulatIons art> based on Section 50-t o t thP
Rehabilitation ..\t't o f 1~-;' : 1 1:! 1 Section 50 -l rf'ads :
:\o o l her w h <" q ud lt i" t< ·d llai id t,·;, pJwd tndl\ tuual tn tlw L"n ttl-' d St a t• · ~
' h a ll . , OJt · l~· IJ~· i' t"<IMIIl oJ' ht' h a ndtt ·a p. lw <'X <"iUU t' U J' rom pa r ttcip a tion in H'
d•·n t< ·d t ht ·. bl' tH ·It h ul o r IJ•· ,uiJI< ·t·t• ·d tu di ,;cr iminat ion und t•r any j.ll'o g 1 .m
n·e~' l\ 111 g •· ,· dt·.-al l 1nanc 1c-t l .t ... :-. i . . t rt iH ' t •

The government has a respon si bility under Section 504 to in estigate all claims of disnimmation on act·ount of handicap in fed rally
assistPd pro~;rams . Congress has similarly charged the exPcutive b ranch
In t·ompanion •·ivil rights laws to pursue complaints of di scrimi n il. to ry
<·undLH ·t based on race, sex. or national origin in program s rec i· J\'IIlg
ft>dPral funding _
·
SPction 50~ was enat·ted by Congress to ensure that renp ie n ts of
federal finan l' ial assistance . including providers of ·'hf'alth sen Jet's' '
opf•rat!:' their fed erally assisted program s without di sc rim ination
agam st handi<'apped individuals. ! 2 2 HPalth t·are servi!"PS must bP J.m >vidPd to handicapped pati ent s ··on a basis of equality with th osP not
handieappt>d ." 12 :l Handicapped patif'nts, thereforE>, mus t be given
"' full and unquPstioned access to th e same type and durat io n of
mpat1 e nt ln•atmt>nt .. as is provided nonhandicapped )Jati en ts. 1 2 ~
Thus. JU st as Title VI provides that patients in federally assist ed hPalth
1·arP )Jrugrams cannot bP treated difff're ntly on the hasis of th e ir rar e.
t·olor. or national origin . Sec tion 504 provides similar pro tect ion
again st di sc rimination on the basis of handi cap.
Sec t ion 50 I is, in Pssl:'n<'e, an equal treatment, nondi sc rim ination
. ; ta ndard . Program s or a c tivities receiving fPderal financial assis tance
may not dPny a bP'nt>fit, servicE' or treatm ent solely on grounds of a
)Jerson 's handil"ap just as th ey may not d e ny a bene fit or service on
~round s or a pe rson 's rat ·e _
() I
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At the time of the New York State court rules on the Baby Jane
Due case, there was no versiop of the "Baby Doe" regulations then in
force. The first set was under injunction, the comment period on thP.
second (proposed) version had only recently ended, and the third,
final version was yet to be issued. Thus, when the HHS Office for Civil
Rights sought Baby Jane's records from University Hospital (S .U.N.Y.
Stony Brook), it did so, not under the authority of the " Baby Doe"
regulations, but under that of the statutory provision itself, and of
pre-existing regulations which require federal financial assistance recipients to ~'permit access . _ . to such of its books, records , accounts, and
other sources of information ... as may be pertinent to ascertain
compliance .... "12 5
When the hospital refused to turn over the requested records , the
Justice Department instituted suit . On Nov. 17, 1983, District Judge
Leonard Wexler granted the hospital 's motion for summary judgment,
denying the federal government access to the records. 1·2s Like the
New York intermediate appellate court, the federal district court ren"
dered a fairly narrow, fact-based ruling. Judge Wexler rejected the
hospital's reliance on the doctor-patient evidentiary privilege and on
the constitutional right of privacy _I2 7 He characterized the latter
argument as " extremely weak ."
In the instant a c tion, plaintiff is , a t le ast implicit ly , all e ging t h e poss ibili ty
that the pare nts of Baby J a ne Doe, in re fu si ng t h ei r conse n t to su rg ica l
procedures, were no t acting in t h e bes t interests of th e child. It would be
highly paradoxica l if a n indi vidu a l 's r ight t o privac y c ould be asserte d by
.that individual 's pare nt or gu ar dian , pu r portedl y ac t ing in t hat ind ividual's
own best inte rests, for th e purpose of precluding an inquiry into the ques"
tion of wheth e r th e pare nt or guardian was in fac t acting in t he individual 's
best interests .. . . Unde r differe nt facts, . . . it is quite possibl e th at an assertion by a pare n ~ o n be h a lf of a handicappe d child of t h e child 's righ t to
privacy made to pre clude th e release o f the child 's m edical records t o officials would not b e s ustain e d as a va lid invocation of th e constitutional righ t
to privacy .
· . . [T J he C ou rt n ee d not di scuss t h e ex t en t to wh ich t h e stat u te autho rizes chalenges [sic J b y th e fe d e ral gove rnm ent t o un reaso nable choices o f
medical treatm e nt for handicappe d children . We may not e , however , t hat it
IS qui te possibl e t ha t t h e sta t ute doe s a ut horiz e such chall enges. If so , t his
would appea r to b e a constitu t ional e x erc ise o f fe d e ral le gi slat ive power,
· given th e fe d e ral inte res t in preve nting discrimination against t he h a ndi"
capped in hospitals re c e iving fede ral financial assistance . _ . 128

However, Judge Wexler . held that, since the regulation at issue
all_owed federal access to institutional records only " to ascertain comPliance," if the institution was "clearly not violating" Section 504, the
government could not obtain access. 129 This was the situation in the
Baby Jane Doe case, he held, for two reasons: first, because the hospital was denying surgery, not on the basis of the child 's handicap, but
because the parents had refused consent and it had no legal right to
Pt'Ovide the surgery without that consent ; second, because " the papers
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submitted to the Court demonstrate conclusively that the decisi• 1 of
the parents to refuse consent to the surgical procedures was a re :;onable one based on due consideration of the medical options ava -:~ble
and on a genuine concern for the best interests of the child." 130
Judge Wexler's decision was unfortunate, not only because, a this
article has earlier demonstrated, 131 he misapprehended the acts
about Baby Jane Doe's medical condition and prospects, bul also
because he seemed to hold that a medical institution could s.l ~ lter
itself behind a parental refusal to consent to treatment as an abc lute
bar to enforcement of the anti-discrimination statute. It is true ' 1at a
physician or medical institution cannot ordinarily perform surg· y or
provide other treatment to a minor when the minor's parents or ~ tardian refuse to consent. However, that refusal does not vitiate th e ospital and the physician's obligation to render clearly necessary ~ spe·
cially life saving) treatment to its patient: the child. Medical pers nnel
have the ability to seek a court order (or, as in the case of New ,'ork,
at least the involvement of the state Child Abuse and Neglect Ag· ncy)
to overcome the refusal to consent in order to protect the life c.•f the
child. Indeed, such governmental intervention is routinely s , ught
when parental religious objections prevent lifesaving treatmen t . rf it is
the practice of a physician or hospital to employ these mechani.., rns to
secure treatment for a nonhandicapped child whose parents refuse
consent to treatment, then failure to do so when a child is handicapped, solely because of the handicap, is prohibited discrim im t ion.
The Justice Department appealed from Judge Wexler's de cisiO n to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On Feb. 23, 1984, a panel of
that court affirmed the district court's decision by a 2-1 majorit y , but
on far more troubling grounds than those employed by the lower
court.
The Court of Appeals rejected the view "that the governm ent was
required to establish some evidence of unlawful discriminati on as a
condition to obtaining the requested records." 132 Instead, it co ncentrated on whether denial of lifesaving treatment to a disabled newborn
could be regarded as "unlawful discrimination" at all under Section
504.
The court's answer was no. It said that Congress had never discussed
or anticipated the application of Section 504 to medical t reatment
decisions concerning disabled newborns while enacting the provisionIt said that Congress, in other contexts, had expressed a disin clination
to regulate health care decisions. It expressed skepticism that a dis·
abled infant could be seen as "otherwise qualified" for med ical treat·
ment:
As the mainstrel!m of cases under Section 504 exemplifies, th e phrase
"otherwise qualified" is geared toward relatively static programs o r ac tivities
such as education, . .. employment, . . . and transportation systems . . . . As
a result, the phrase cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid con text of
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medical treatment decisions without distorting its plain meaning. In common parlance, one would not ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering
from multiple birth defects as being " otherwise qualified " to have corrective
surgery performed or to have a hospital initiate litigation seeking to override
a decision against surgery by the infant's pare nts . 133

The court relied heavily on the "complexity" of medical decisions.
"[T] he government has taken an oversimplified view of the medical
decisionmaking process. Where the handicapped condition is related to
the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say
with certl!-inty that a particular decision was 'discriminatory.' "13 4
These concerns are groundless. A conclusive response appears in the
"Supplemental Information P accompanying the final "Baby Doe" rule:
[W] here the handicapping condition and the condition to be treated are the
same . .·. the "handicap" is the physical or mental impairment the infant has
or will have (or "is regarded as having " ) after complet ion of the treatment
under consideration. In the case of an infant born with myelomeningocel e,
for example, the treatment which must be considered is surgery to close the
protruding sac to prevent infection and other potentially fatal conse quences. The "handicap" is the physical and / or mental impairment the
infant is regarded as likely to have in future life. To the extent the myelo meningocele itself or other complications . . . present, in t he exercise of
reasonable medical judgment, contraindications to the surgery , the infan t is
not able to benefit, in spite of his o r her handicap, from the surgery.
However, if the surgery would be . .. likely , in th e exercise of reasonable
medical judgment, to bring about its intended result of avoiding infection or
other fatal consequences, then failure to perform the surgery because of the
anticipated impairments in future life offends section 5 04 , as the withholding of surgery is because of the handicap and in spite of the infan t's
being qualified to receive the surgery . 135

As the dissent pointed out, the majority evaded the clear intent of

~ongress to analogize discrimination against the disabled to discrimination on the basis of race.
A judgment not to perform certain surgery because a person is black is not a
bona fide medical judgment. So too, a decision not to correct a life .threatening digestive problem because an infant has Down 's Syndrome is not a
bona fide medical judgment. The issue of parental authority is also quickly
disposed of. A denial of medical treatment to an infant because the infant is
black is not legitimated by parental consent .. ..
The logic of the government 's position on these aspects of the case is
thus about as flawl ess as a legal argument can be. 136

. As we write, a Justice Department motion for a rehearing en bane
l>ending before the full Second Circuit. Whatever happens to that
lllotion, eventual recourse to the Supreme Court is likely.

18

The Constitutional Issue Is Ripe
ti ~tever may be the ultimate outcome of the statutory constructhon ISsue rai~ed i? United States of America v. Univ~r~ity_Hospital of
e State Unwerslty of New York at Stony · Brook, 1t 1s vrrtually cer-
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tain that sooner or later the constitutional issues raised by d e · 1! of
treatment cases will have to be faced , ultimately by the SL ·erne
Court. As we write, there is legislation pending in Congres (one
version has been passed by the House of Representatives, vhile
another has been reported out of committee in the Senate ) hich
would specifically address the nontreatment issue in terms tha· a uld
leave no judicial doubt about Congressional intent to face it squaJ y.l 37
Should a law that passes regulate the area in some fo rn it is
virtually certain that the American Medical Association or som · Jther
group of medical professionals will challenge it, relying on a f m of
the familial privacy doctrine. It is almost as certain that som ( lay a
child with a disability will be denied treatment in a state hosp it : or in
some other circumstances constituting state action and someor with
standing to raise the child's rights will contend that the Constit t ion is
being violated by that denial.
In either case, the resulting litigation will undoubtedly see clash
of the contending constitutional theories : the parents' assert~:· right
to privacy versus the child's asserted right to life and equal pro .~ ctio n
of the law . The Court will decide no more crucial case in our neration. It will test whether we, as a nation, still maintain, as Justi• ,, John
Marshall Harlan wrote, that "In view of the Constitution, in thE eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior ... class of citize n ~ . . .. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the !a ·.v . The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful." 138
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APPENDIX
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
THE COUNTY OF MONROE
STATE OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE TREATMENT AND CARE OF I NFA NT DOE
CAUSE NO. GU 8204-004A
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Th is m atter ca m e to be heard by t h e Cou rt under certain ex trao rdi na ry condi·
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tions conce rnin g the e m erge ncy care a nd treat m en t of a minor c hild born at t he
Bloomington H os pital.
The Court was contacted at h is reside nce by representatives of the .Bloo m ington Hospital. On the basis of representat io ns m ade by t h ose re prese n tatives, th e
Court quickl y determ in e d t h at a n extreme em ergency existed.
The Cou rt further determi ne d that t he Ju dge of the Monroe Circuit Court had
been contacte d co ncernin g t hi s m atter and was unable to attend the e m erge ncy
hearing, and th e Co urt p ersonall y contacted t he J udge of the Monroe Circ u it
Court who directed t h is Cou rt to p roceed with .hearing. Thereafter , hearing was
held on t he S ixth Floor of the Bl oomington Hospital at approximately 10 :3 0
p.m., Sa t urday, the lOt h d ay of Apri l, 1982.
The fQilowing perso ns were prese nt : Jo hn Do e, natural fat her of I n fant Doe,
with counsel, And rew C. Mallor, Esquire; Maggie Ke ller, Gene Perry, Ad m inistrative Vice-Presid ents of Bl oom ington Hospital ; Len E. Bunge r, counsel for Bloomington Hospi tal ; Dr. Wa lter L . Owens , Dr. William R. Anderson , Dr. Brandt L.
Ludlow, obstetricians a dm itted to practice in the State of Indiana with privileges
at Bloom ington Hospital, D octor O we ns bei ng the o bstetrician in atten dance at
delivery o f Infan t Doe; D r. Paul J. We nzler , family practitioner with pediatric
privilege at Bloom ingto n H ospital and who has atte nded to Mr . and Mrs. Doe's
other two children after t h eir birth ; Dr. Jam es J . Schaffer and Dr . Jam es J .
Laughlin ,' pediatric ia ns h o ld ing ped iatric privileges at Bloomington Hospital. (Mrs.
Doe was ph ysicall y un able to atte n d. )
The Court thereafter heard e vi d ence. Do"tor Owens spoke for and on behalf of
the obs te tric group th at de li vered t h e Infant Doe , advising the Court that at approximately 8: 19 p .m . o n t h e eveni n g of Apri l 9, In fant D oe was born to Mary Doe in
an uneve nt ful de li very, bu t that sh ortly thereafter it was very apparent that the
child suffere d from Dow n 's Sy nd rome, with the further complication of trac h eoesophageal fistul a, m ea nin g t he passage from t he mouth to t he stomac h ha d not
appropriately develope d a nd , in fact , were the c h ild to be fed orally, s u bstances
would be ta ke n into t h e lungs and t h e ch ild m ost likely would suffocate.
. Doctor Owe ns furt h er stated t h at he ha d been previously advise d that Doctor
Wenzler would se rve as practit io ner for I nfant Doe an d that he was furt h er ad vised
th_at Doctor We nzler, w he n face d w it h extraordinary cases , routinely co nsulted
~lth Doct or Schaffer. Doctor Sc h affer was at the Bloo m ington Hospital at th at
bme and was call ed b y D octor O wens and was requeste d to exam ine t he ba h y.
Doctor Wenzler was n otifie d. Doctors Owens, Schaffer an d Wenzler co nsulted;
Doctors Wenzl er and S c ha ffer in di cated t hat the p roper treat m ent for In fa n t Doe
was his immed iate tra nsfer to R iley Hospital for corrective su rgery. Doctor
~Wens, re prese nti ng t he co ncurring opinions of h imself , Drs. An derson a nd
k Udlow, recommende d t h at t h e ch il d remam at Bloom mgton Hosp1tal w tth full
Bnowledge tha t surgery to c o rrect trac heoesophageal fistula was n ot possibl e at
loom~ngton Hospital a nd t h at with in a short period of ti m e the ch ild wo uld
succ ~mb due to ina bility to receive n u trients and / or p n eumonia.
te His reco mmended co u rse of treatment consisted of basic techniq ues ad m inist re_d _to aid in k eeping t h e c h ild comfortable and free of pain. Doctor Owe ns
a~~lfled th at,_ even if su rgery werP. successful, the pos~ibility of a. m inim ~lly
quate quah ty of life was non-existe nt due to the childs severe and 1rrevers1ble
mental reta rdati on.
.Docto r Schaffer test ifie d t h at Doctor O wens's progn osis regarding th e ch ild 's
mental retarda ti on was correct but that he believed t h e o nl y accepta bl e course of
~edical treatm en t was tra nsf~r to R iley Hospital in Indianapo lis for repair of
racheoesophageal fistul a.
La Doc_to r Wenzler con c ur re d in D octor Sc haffer's pro p osed treatm e n t. Doctor
W Ughhn t esti fi e d t hat he co nc u rre d in t he opinions of D octors Schaffer a nd
enzler, and he d iffere d wi t h D octor Owens 's opinion in t hat he k new of at least
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